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Abstract Forming a tax group for corporate and trade tax purposes in Germany
has its advantages in terms of tax savings for the companies concerned. Depending
on the profit situation, for certain companies these benefits were extended by the
2001 German corporate tax reform. However, setting up a tax group in Germany is
also accompanied by certain disadvantages for the consolidated companies,
resulting especially from the assumption of increased liability for subsidiaries’
losses. The objective of this study is to investigate the factors determining the
decision in favour of, or against, the formation of a tax group. A natural experiment
arising from the 2001 German corporate tax reform allowed us to determine to what
extent companies exploited the increased potential benefits of a tax group post
reform. We test this finding employing firm-level data from the database AMA-
DEUS. Our results show that the number of tax groups increased significantly with
the introduction of the exemption method as from 01.01.2001. This result is espe-
cially apparent amongst companies benefiting from a tax group only post reform.
Yet eligible companies which would have obtained tax benefits by entering into a
tax group did not always choose this option. This applies in particular to parent
companies with subsidiaries that are not wholly owned, and to small subsidiaries.
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1 Introduction
Forming a tax group for corporate and trade tax purposes1 has its merits in terms of
tax savings for the companies concerned. This depends especially on the manner in
which profits and losses are spread amongst the parent company and its subsidiaries
and the way in which corporate dividends are taxed in the hands of the parent
company. Taxation of corporate dividends changed significantly with the introduc-
tion of the exemption method for corporate shareholders in 2001. Therefore, one
may expect that tax groups were opted for more frequently post reform. Empirical
analysis confirms that the number of tax groups indeed increased, yet in relation to
the total number of companies eligible it emerges that only some 30% actually made
use of this option (see Sect. 3.2.1). We therefore seek to determine the factors that
drive companies to form a tax group, or deter them from doing so.
Exploiting the possible benefits of corporate group taxation in Germany requires,
among other things, the conclusion of a profit and loss transfer agreement between
parent and subsidiary. This agreement obliges a subsidiary to transfer its entire
profit to the controlling parent company. Where the subsidiary suffers losses, on the
other hand, a profit and loss transfer agreement brings with it the obligation that the
parent company has to compensate its subsidiary for losses incurred. Thus, in order
to be able to benefit from the advantages a tax group offers, companies have to
‘‘pay’’ by assuming the risk of becoming liable for the losses of a subsidiary.
For purposes of assessing the tax impact on the choice of organizational form
when establishing a corporate group, we analyse the possible cash flow effects under
the two alternatives, comparing the benefits of a tax group with those of a standard
group.2 In order to identify situations where forming a tax group provides tax
benefits, we exploit a natural experiment that arose from the 2001 German reform
regarding the taxation of dividends in the hands of corporate shareholders. The
changeover to the exemption method at the level of corporate shareholders had the
effect of extending the scope for beneficial use of a tax group. In contrast to the tax
credit method situation, creating a corporate tax group is now essential for offsetting
parent company losses against profits of affiliated group companies, as resulted
automatically under the tax credit system. Concluding a profit and loss transfer
agreement, on the other hand, is costly and may lead to the further disadvantage that
the scope of losses for which a parent company assumes liability is enlarged beyond
the subsidiary’s equity capital. As related costs are fixed in their nature and liability
risks have particular effect where minority shareholders exist, these disadvantages
turn out to deter above all small companies, as well as parent companies with
subsidiaries that are not wholly owned.
Furthermore, we test empirically what kind of companies and to what extent
eligible companies refrain from exploiting the tax advantages inherent to using a tax
group. The percentage of such companies can be regarded as an indicator of how
1 Such a tax group is referred to in German tax law as an ‘‘Organschaft’’. For the convenience of the
international reader we adopt the term ‘‘tax group’’ in the text.
2 A ‘‘standard group’’ as referred to in this paper consists of a parent company and its majority-owned
subsidiary which have not concluded a profit and loss transfer agreement and thus do not form a tax
group.
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severe the load of assuming liability risks via profit and loss transfer agreement is
perceived to be by eligible companies that would otherwise benefit from the
formation of a tax group. Our investigation refers to the period from 1994 to 2003
and is limited to controlling companies organised in the legal form of a corporation.
This limitation in scope is due to several reasons. Firstly, controlling companies
organised as partnerships in practice hold less business relevance. Secondly, with
respect to partnerships only few sets of data are available. Finally, important
information with impact on the benefits of group taxation (e.g. income tax burden,
income tax credit for trade tax paid) is not publicly available.
To our knowledge, this aspect regarding the influence of taxation on group
structure has not up to now been subject to empirical research in the literature.
Although the benefits of group taxation are subject to investigation in Weichen-
rieder and Mintz (2008), these authors address the question of what determines the
ownership chains. Their focus is on third country conduit entities in German
inbound and outbound foreign direct investment, in comparison with which
exploitation of the benefits of a country holding presents a perfect alternative.
Bu¨ttner et al. (2008) analyse strategic consolidation under formula apportionment.
They investigate the question whether multijurisdictional enterprises strategically
refrain from consolidation to preserve profit-shifting opportunities, by exploiting a
quasi experiment that arose from another change in German tax law associated with
the company tax reform in 2001. Desai et al. (2004) present results showing that
whole ownership is most common when firms benefit from worldwide tax planning
opportunities. Empirical evidence on the effects of tax loss set-offs shows that loss
offset constraints affect corporate tax incentives (Altshuler and Auerbach (1990),
Auerbach and Poterba (1986)). Ge´rard and Weiner (2003) investigate analytically
the effect of introducing cross border loss offset and apportionment of the tax base,
on inter alia the behaviour of a multijurisdictional firm. By the same token, based on
a dynamic model of capital budgeting, Sureth and U¨ffing (2008) analyse the
influence on corporate decisions of taxing multinationals under proposed concepts
for corporate taxation in the EU. Oestreicher and Koch (2008) provide an
assessment of the potential consequences for average corporate tax rates that would
result from implementation of a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
(CCCTB) as proposed by the European Commission, and of possible methods for
achieving an EU-wide loss-offset for multinational groups. Finally, the link between
limited liability for losses and organizational form of companies is scrutinized.
Gentry (1994) finds that publicly traded partnerships, eligible to escape from double
taxation of income because their income is not subject to corporate tax, have less
risky assets than corporations. However, this literature does not investigate factors
determining the decision to opt for a group taxation system. This question continues
to be one with particular German relevance as far as the profit and loss transfer
agreement is concerned. However, the impact of the relevant corporate tax system
(i.e. tax credit system vs. dividend exemption system) on the decision to form a tax
group is also important with respect to other countries. This applies especially for
EU member states which, for the most part, have changed their tax system to
exempt corporate dividends in recent years (see Jacobs 2007: 115–125) and is of all
the more significance in the event of the determination of income and the offsetting
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of corporate losses cross-border being harmonised in the EU (see European Court of
Justice 2008a, b, 2005; Commission of the European Communities 2001, 2006,
2007; Endres et al. 2007: 104).
Our paper is set out as follows. Section 2 deals with the various tax consequences
resulting from (the formation of) a tax group for purposes of taxes on corporate
profits. Here, we theoretically analyse under what circumstances advantages would
result from a tax point of view. In Sect. 3 the relevance of the tax group is subject to
empirical investigation. We employ descriptive statistical methods to obtain a first
impression of the extent to which group taxation has been applied in different
settings over the period under review. Moreover, inductive statistical methods are
applied in order to identify the relevant criteria governing the use of a tax group
from a tax point of view. Based on these findings we discuss the principal results.
Section 4 concludes the discussion.
2 Application of the German group taxation regime
2.1 Outline of German group taxation provisions
Corporations with their seat or place of management in Germany have, as separate
legal entities, an unlimited liability to corporate tax. In the context of a corporate
group this separate liability to tax has the effect that income of the individual group
companies is determined and taxed in principle as if each company was legally and
economically independent (separate entity theory). As a consequence, double or
multiple taxation may arise where the profit of a subsidiary is distributed to parent
companies. Furthermore, it is not possible to set off losses arising in a subsidiary
against profits of the parent or of any other group company. Finally, intra-group
transactions may result in taxable profits or losses.
In order to mitigate potential disadvantages compared to companies using
permanent establishment structures, the German corporate tax law allows opting for
a corporate fiscal unity. Under the system of fiscal unity the profits or losses of a
(German) subsidiary (‘‘the controlled company’’) are attributed to and taxed at the
level of the parent company3 (‘‘the controlling company’’).4 The preconditions for
this are that the controlled company is integrated into the business of the controlling
company and commits itself by contract to transferring its entire profit to the
controlling company, while the controlling company is obliged to compensate the
controlled company for any losses incurred. For a tax group to be accepted, this
agreement has to be concluded and carried out for a minimum period of 5 years.
Integration into the business of the controlling company is deemed to exist if the
3 The territorial scope of the German group tax regime takes into account only domestic entities. This,
however, does not mean that the members of a tax group must be in every case be domestic companies, but
allows a domestic permanent establishment of a foreign company to be the head of a domestic tax group.
4 The term ‘‘controlling company’’ refers to the holding company meeting the precondition of
functioning as the top company (‘‘Organtra¨ger’’) of a German tax group (‘‘Organschaft’’); this company
is not necessarily the ultimate parent company of the group as a whole (‘‘Konzern’’) or even of its German
subgroup.
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subsidiary’s equity is held directly or indirectly to an extent of at least 50% by a
German parent entity.5 Transfer of profits and compensation for losses does not
relieve the controlled company from being a tax subject. The company is thus
required to determine profits and losses as if the fiscal unity did not exist.
When comparing the relevant criteria involved in the decision to form a tax group
during the period under review, 1994–2003, it has to be noted that the prerequisites
for entering into a tax group as described above are applicable only since assessment
period 2001. Up to this date it was necessary for the controlled company to be
integrated into the controlling company not only financially, but also economically,
and in terms of organization. Thus, in the course of the 2001 German corporate tax
reform the requirements for entering into a tax group were clearly relaxed.
2.2 Advantages in theory of forming a tax group before and after the 2001 tax
reform
Applying the rules of a tax group has its merits for the companies involved. Of
greatest relevance is the immediate loss-offset among the members of the
consolidated group. Further advantages include cost and interest savings regarding
taxes that do not have to be withheld, as no withholding taxes arise on profits
attributed to the controlling company. Moreover, more favourable compliance
obligations and financial accounting requirements, and, in the event of group debt
financing, trade tax savings as well as a comprehensive deductibility of participation
related expenses, are also beneficial.6 The extent of these effects and the benefits of
a tax group are dependent on various influencing factors. Besides, the profitability of
the group companies, the extent of group finance, and corporate tax systems applied
are of special relevance.
In this context, the 2001 German corporate tax reform was of particular
significance concerning the benefits offered by a tax group. Until the 2000
assessment period inclusively, corporations were taxed according to the credit
method in Germany. Since the 2001 assessment period the taxation of corporations
has been carried out according to an exemption system. With regard to the period
under review (1994–2003) it is therefore necessary, when discussing the benefits of
a group tax system for income tax purposes, to differentiate between the tax
advantages of the credit method and those of the exemption method.
Where relief from double taxation is achieved by exempting dividends received
by a corporate shareholder (exemption system), multiple taxation of a subsidiary’s
profit is avoided effectively. This, however, also brings with it the negative
consequence that expenses at the level of the parent company associated with the
participation in economic terms may not be deducted from the profit of this
5 Thus, shares must also be taken into account which are held by an intermediate domestic or foreign
partnership. Although permissible under German tax law, tax groups formed using a German branch of a
foreign entity, however, are excluded from consideration in this study.
6 A further (non-quantifiable) advantage results from an immediate profit transfer to the parent company
under the profit and loss transfer agreement, whereas dividend payments may only be made for a previous
year (Prinz 2003).
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company. Furthermore, profits and losses of the individual group companies cannot
be set off intra-group.
Where the credit method is applied in order to protect companies from double
taxation, multiple taxation of a subsidiary’s profits is ruled out by means of a tax
credit mechanism. As dividends are taxable at the level of the shareholder, profits
may also be set off against parent company losses. Finally, participation expenses
may be deducted at the level of the parent company. Setting off losses of a
subsidiary, however, is not possible if no tax group has been set up.
As it can be seen from Tables 1 and 2, forming a tax group provides the
companies concerned with tax benefits in three different profit/loss situations:
1. Income of the parent company [ zero, income of the subsidiary \ zero: due to
the principle of separate entity it is basically not possible to offset tax losses of a
subsidiary against profits of a parent company, irrespective of the system of
corporate taxation applied. In the present case, where the subsidiary suffers
losses, the group taxation regime for income tax purposes has the effect of
creating interest advantages to the extent that, by way of group taxation, losses
may be offset earlier than under the separate entity principle.7 These interest
advantages from offsetting losses are, therefore, at their greatest where the
losses may be offset immediately.8 For this to be possible it is sufficient for the
positive income of the parent company to exceed the negative income of the
subsidiary. This will often be the case, since positive income of further
subsidiaries is included in the taxable income of the parent company. The
longer it would take the subsidiary to offset losses against future positive
Table 1 Exemption system loss-offset mechanism (standard group) as compared to a tax group
Parent Profits Losses
Tax group Standard group Tax group Standard group
Subsidiary
Profits Attribution to the
profits of the
parent company
Tax exempt income at







Tax exempt income at









Loss carry-back or loss
carry-forward at the
level of the subsidiary
(i.e. no offset against





Loss carry-back or loss
carry-forward at the
level of the subsidiary
7 Until 2003 under the exemption method expenses associated with dividend income were only
deductible in the case of dividend income being received by the parent company. In the case of the
subsidiary incurring losses, therefore, the parent company suffered no disadvantage even in the absence of
a tax group.
8 It is assumed that in the absence of group taxation the losses of the subsidiary may only be offset by
way of loss carry-forward.
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income, the higher the interest advantages. This effect arises to the same extent
under the exemption method and under the credit method.
2. Income of the parent company [ zero, income of the subsidiary [ zero: where
both the parent company and the subsidiary make profits, group taxation has
withholding tax advantages both under the credit method and under the
exemption method since profit transfer (as opposed to profit distribution) is not
subject to tax at the time of transfer.
A further factor applying within the framework of the exemption method
concerns expenses associated with tax exempted (domestic) profit distributions. In
the assessment period 2001–2003 such expenses were only deductible within a tax
group9 whereas according to the credit method the participation expenses of the
parent company were also deductible in the absence of group taxation under the
credit method. Under certain circumstances, however, the corresponding disadvan-
tage of standard groups can be neutralized to a considerable extent by means of tax
planning.10
3. Income of the parent company \ zero, income of the subsidiary [ zero: under
the credit method dividends are taxable at the level of the shareholder. For that
reason distributed earnings are also taxable, i.e. offsettable even in the absence
of a tax group.11 Contrastingly, under the exemption method participation
income is tax-free at the level of the parent company where the parent company
operates in the legal form of a corporation. In this case, offsetting profits of the
Table 2 Credit system loss-offset mechanism (standard group) as compared to a tax group
Parent Profits Losses
Tax group Standard group Tax group Standard group
Subsidiary











Taxable income at the level
of the parent company
(i.e. offset against parent
company losses)











losses of the parent
company
Loss carry-back or loss
carry-forward at the level
of the subsidiary
9 The current legal status of this provision was introduced by law dated 22.12.2003 (BGBl. I 2003,
p. 2840) and applied as from the assessment period 2004 onwards.
10 According to the ‘‘ballooning’’ strategy, as a rule no annual dividend payments are made for the period
in which the participation expenses are incurred (normally the refinancing period). To a great extent this
avoids the disadvantages caused by deductions for participation expenses being unavailable since
deductibility required actual dividend payments (§ 3c Income Tax Act [ITA]).
11 In order to take account of possible interdependencies between intra-group loss-offset and inter-period
loss-offset at the level of the parent company, profit of the parent company is in principle regarded as
positive income (after loss deduction) and loss as negative income (after loss carry-back).
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subsidiary against losses of the parent company is possible only if parent
company and subsidiary have opted to form part of a tax group for corporate
income tax purposes. Thus, under the exemption method group taxation (only)
has advantages insofar as losses of the parent company can be offset at an
earlier point in time than possible under the separate entity principle. These
interest advantages arising from profit transfer are at their maximum where the
profits of the subsidiary may be immediately offset against losses of the parent
company. For this to be the case, it is sufficient for (negative) income of the
parent company to exceed the (positive) income of the subsidiary or
subsidiaries. Here, these interest advantages are dependent upon the time
interval between the event of losses being offset intra-group and the point(s) in
time where the profits of the subsidiary/parent can be offset against (own)
losses/profits.
Furthermore, in the assessment periods 2001–2003, expenses associated with tax
exempt (domestic) profit distributions are only deductible within a tax group. They
represent an additional advantage of group taxation. Finally, an interest advantage
arises through the existence of a tax group since profit transfers are not subject to
withholding tax in this case.
Other advantages of a tax group are independent of the profit situation of the
group companies and of the corporate tax system applied. This concerns especially
relief with regard to trade tax. In the case of a subsidiary being loan financed intra-
group, there is no requirement to calculate 50% of the interest payments associated
with the loan into the trade tax base where a tax group exists between the subsidiary
and the loan financing parent company. This results in a reduction of the effective
trade tax burden where a tax group exists for trade tax purposes.
The benefits derived from a tax group under the exemption method and the tax
credit method are summarized in Table 3. Comparison of the relevant factors
reveals that the different criteria carry varying significance as far as the advantages
of a tax group are concerned. The relevant individual factors are the level of income
offsettable between parent company and subsidiary, the time interval between the
offsetting of losses intra-group or inter-period, the level of participation expenses,
the interest rate, and the rate of long-term inter-company loan. According to data
from the German Bundesbank the average level of shareholder liability, however, is
low.12 If it is taken into account that the disadvantage created by the limitation on
deductibility of participation expenses can be minimized by way of tax planning,
and the interest disadvantage resulting from the payment of withholding tax is
limited to 1 year and is dependent on payment of dividends, we must assume that by
far the greatest emphasis is on the advantage of immediate loss offset. Since the
changeover to the exemption method, this has applied not only to the offset of losses
of a subsidiary, but also in that a tax group allows the losses of a parent company to
be offset against profits of its subsidiary or subsidiaries. Of lesser importance,
however, are the financing of withholding tax payments and the fact that
12 For a representative average enterprise for the year 2002 the statistics of the German Bundesbank
indicate long-term liabilities vis-a`-vis affiliated companies to be 3.1% as a portion of the balance sheet
amount, cf. Deutsche Bundesbank (2006).
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participation expenses are not tax deductible. Finally, taking the empirical data of
the German Bundesbank for a representative enterprise, the obligation to calculate
interest payments on long-term loan into the trade tax base plays only a minor role.
2.3 Disadvantages of forming a tax group
Meeting the prerequisites of a tax group brings not only advantages. Concluding a
profit transfer agreement may, for example, be costly, especially in the case that
compensation payments to minority shareholders have to be ascertained. Moreover, a
profit and loss transfer agreement brings with it the risk of being held liable for claims
vis-a`-vis controlled companies. Further disadvantages may arise if the controlled
company carries forward losses that accrued prior to formation of a tax group. Finally,
there may also be disadvantages with respect to trade tax if the necessary allocation of
the tax base for trade tax purposes would result in a higher tax burden compared to the
attribution of profits and losses under the separate entity principle.
Whereas the advantages of forming a tax group can be traced back to its tax
treatment, the disadvantages result primarily from civil law consequences of the
profit and loss transfer agreement. From a tax perspective, setting up a tax group can
be disadvantageous above all where the subsidiary carries forward losses which, in
the absence of a tax group, could be set off against positive income of this company
(Table 4, item 1). In addition, disadvantages may arise through allocation for trade
tax purposes if the trade tax base is allocated to a location with a higher trade tax
levying rate (Table 4, item 2).
Table 3 Benefits of forming a tax group
Criteria Benefits of a tax group under the Implications of the change to the
exemption system as from 2001
with regard to the benefits of a
tax group compared to the
taxation of the group as separate
entities





Offsetting losses of a
subsidiary against profits of
a parent company
Yes Yes No fundamental change
Withholding taxes on intra-
group profit distributions




No Yes Improvement, in the case that the
subsidiary distributes profits
Offsetting profits of a
subsidiary against losses of
the parent company
No Yes Broadening of application under
the exemption method; benefits
dependent upon existence of
pre-contractual losses
Multiple taxation of intra-
group interest payments
Yes Yes No fundamental improvement;
disadvantages may even result
as a selective forming of a tax
group for trade tax purposes
is no longer possible
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Where a subsidiary carries forward losses, forming a tax group has the effect of
‘‘freezing’’ these loss carry-forwards for its duration. Although, after the tax group
has been terminated, losses from the pre-transfer agreement period can be brought
back into play, taking into account a minimum term of 5 years and assuming an
interest rate of 5.5% the devaluation of the loss carry-forwards resulting from the
time lapse amounts to more than 23%. Closer scrutiny reveals, however, that this
devaluation is linked with the tax group only if the subsidiary has positive income
that could have been offset under the terms of a tax group. But even in this case
disadvantages arise only if the profits of the subsidiary cannot be set off against
losses of the parent company. In the event that the parent company suffers losses the
tax group merely prevents prior losses from being shifted to the level of the parent
company.
It is fair to assume, however, that the main hindrances to setting up a tax group
are the disadvantages of a profit and loss transfer agreement arising from civil law,
in particular the associated liability risks. Within the framework of a profit and loss
transfer agreement the controlling company has to assume any annual financial
losses incurred by the controlled enterprise during the term of the contract. This
applies only if the financial losses cannot be compensated by other reserves set up
by the controlled company while the agreement is effective. The dependent
company further undertakes to refrain from waiving this compensation claim for a
period of 3 years following the termination of the agreement. Taking into account
that the profit and loss transfer agreement is concluded for a minimum period of
5 years it becomes apparent that this element of a profit and loss transfer agreement
constitutes a considerable risk for the controlling enterprise.
A further problem arises from the corporate law provisions regarding the creation
of a contractual group. At the top of the list in this respect are the possible
compensation payments to minority shareholders which have to be paid either
upfront or as a guaranteed dividend, irrespective of whether the controlled company
Table 4 Disadvantages of forming a tax group
Criteria Disadvantages of a tax group under the Implications of the change to the
exemption system as from 2001
with regard to the benefits of a
tax group compared to the







Pre-contractual losses Yes Yes No fundamental improvement;
disadvantages exist also in the
case that profits of the
subsidiary may be offset
against losses of the parent
company (see Table 3, item 4)
Allocation advantages/
disadvantages with
respect to trade tax
Yes Yes No fundamental improvement;
disadvantages may even result
as a selective forming of a tax
group for trade tax purposes is
no longer possible
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is profitable or suffers losses. Moreover, concluding a profit and loss transfer
agreement requires several actions including, but not limited to, designing the
contract, determining compensation payments to minority shareholders, if neces-
sary, notarizing approval by the shareholders assembly, entering the agreement in
the commercial register, drawing up a board members’ report as well as performing
an audit by certified accountants including a relevant report. The total costs of
fulfilling these requirements may add up to significant amounts.
2.4 Interim conclusions
The above discussion of the prerequisites as well as the advantages and
disadvantages from entering into a tax group gives rise to the following expectations
with regard to the advantageousness of the tax group and its application over the
course of the period under review:
1. Following the enactment of the 2001 tax reform the number of group
companies subject to group taxation should have risen since the advantages of
the tax group have been extended and, at the same time, the prerequisites
reduced.
2. In comparison to the years prior to 2001 it is to be expected that from 2001
amongst the newly formed tax groups the proportion of parent companies
reporting own losses increased.
3. Relaxing the group taxation prerequisites should have a differing effect on
small and large subsidiaries assuming that the stricter prerequisites prior to the
reform deterred especially small companies from entering into a tax group. The
same applies to subsidiaries with minority shareholders for which the
verification of organizational and economic integration, as required prior to
the reform, can be assumed to have posed greater difficulties than for wholly
owned subsidiaries.
4. Losses carried forward at the level of the subsidiary should deter groups from
forming a tax group. This applies in particular when both the parent company
and the subsidiary report profits.
5. Loan financing by the parent company should on average be of minor relevance
for forming a tax group. Only in the case of subsidiaries financed with parent
company debt to an extraordinarily great extent, trade tax deductibility of
interest expenses may turn out to be an impacting factor.
6. In view of the costs associated with concluding a profit and loss transfer
agreement, the benefits of a tax group are expected to be exploited the more
frequently, the larger the (financial capacity of) the group companies.
7. In view of the costs that may arise in terms of minority shareholders’
entitlements arising from forming a contractual group, it is to be expected that
tax groups are more common where the participation is 100%.
8. The liability risks associated with forming a tax group may be expected to
function as a deterrent to including subsidiaries that indicate an increased risk
of incurring losses even though the tax benefits of a tax group are increased at
the same time. However, these tax benefits can compensate the parent company
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not to full extent for the costs associated with liability for definite losses
incurred at the level of the subsidiary.
Due to data restrictions not all of these eight hypotheses can be subjected to
empirical verification. This applies to hypotheses 4 and 5, whereas hypothesis 8 can be
tested only indirectly. Hypotheses 2 and 3 indicate that the 2001 tax reform had
particular impact for (1) groups in which the subsidiary reports profits, while the parent
company suffers losses, (2) small subsidiaries and (3) subsidiaries with minority
shareholders. When analysing the effect of the tax reform on the decision to opt for a tax
group or not, these differences call for a distinct consideration of the individual groups.
3 Empirical results
3.1 Data
Employing the database AMADEUS,13 the following empirical analysis of the criteria
for forming a tax group for corporate tax purposes is based on company micro-data.
AMADEUS is a comprehensive pan-European database containing financial infor-
mation on some nine million public and private companies in 38 European countries
and is made available by the private database provider Bureau van Dijk. It contains
standardised (consolidated and unconsolidated) annual accounts (for up to 10 years),
financial ratios, activities and ownership information for the companies included.
The part of the database relevant for this study covers German parent companies
and their domestic subsidiaries. A parent-subsidiary relationship is deemed to exist
if the subsidiary is held (directly or indirectly) to an extent of at least 50% by a
German parent company.14 According to this definition, 22,142 domestic groups are
identified comprising a total of 61,707 group companies. Since the information
available for the companies covered by AMADEUS is not complete in all cases
further limitations are necessary when applying the data. Information with regard to
profit and loss transfer agreements does not form part of the AMADEUS database.
Therefore, the existence of a tax group for income tax purposes has to be identified
on the basis of its visible features. To this end, we assume that a tax group exists
where the profit or loss of the subsidiary for the period is transferred in full to a
parent company. Profit transfers and assumption of losses are shown in the
extraordinary income. Thus it is possible to assume a controlled company where the
subsidiary’s profit or loss for the period is shown as zero whereas the result of
ordinary business activities is above or below zero.15 Therefore, the investigation
13 Our analysis is based mainly on update 125 (February 2005). Accounting data for 2003 was added
from update 179 (January 2009) as this is not provided to full extent in update 125. Furthermore,
shareholding information from update 64 (January 2000) is employed in order to identify group structure
changes.
14 This selection is based on the German tax group rules (§ 14 Para. 1 Corporation Tax Act [CTA]).
15 Drawing on federal statistics on corporate taxation for 2001, a test revealed that this assumption of the
existence of controlled companies was correct in 87 out of 94 cases (92.55%). Out of a total of 1,010
companies not belonging to a tax group only 31 (3.07%) were wrongly assumed to be controlled
companies.
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included only those subsidiaries for which at least one unconsolidated financial
statement for the period 1994–2003 was available showing both the income from
ordinary business activities and the profit or loss on the year.
As far as the controlling company is concerned, it is presumed that the tax group
relationship exists to the directly participating enterprise in each case. Since a
breakdown of the financial results regarding finance income and financing costs is not
available in AMADEUS, precise identification is not possible. However, any incorrect
attribution associated with this may be assumed to be of only minor significance as the
tax group relationship to subordinated companies is not devoid of legal difficulties
where shareholders are involved. Furthermore, 76.06% of the subsidiaries included in
the panel are held directly by the top parent company in any case.
For purposes of checking whether the results are distorted in that companies are
included in the panel while belonging to a group in 2003 but not in previous years, a
subpanel (Panel 2) is employed in supplementary manner. This subpanel comprises
only those companies that are (a) also included in update 64 of AMADEUS
(January 2000) and (b) controlled by the same company in both updates. This
procedure allows that the relevant controlling company may be assumed to be
identified throughout the entire period under review.16
One objective of the regression analysis is the identification of potential
treatment effects resulting from the 2001 company tax reform. This requires a
further reduction of the company panel applied. Included in our regression are only
those companies belonging to Panel 1 or Panel 2 for which the feature of being a
controlled company can be assessed for at least 1 year in the period prior to the
reform (1994–2000) and 1 year following the reform (2001–2003). The resulting
panels applied to our regression model comprise 660 subsidiaries (Panel 1) and 120
subsidiaries (Panel 2), respectively.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
3.2.1 Development of the number of controlled companies over the period
under review
The combination of enhanced conditions favouring formation of a tax group and
relaxation of the prerequisites of a tax group for corporate tax purposes suggests that
the number of controlled companies (subsidiaries belonging to a tax group) will
have risen as from assessment period 2001. In order to obtain a first impression of
the reform’s impact, the data basis was analysed with reference to the individual
years of the period under review (1994–2003). In so doing we differentiated
between the two test-panels discussed above. Panel 1 contains all companies which
according to the participation details provided in update 125 of the AMADEUS
database were financially integrated into a parent company, whereas Panel 2 further
limits the extent of the panel to those subsidiaries controlled by the same company
16 In general, employing shareholder information from a year nearer to the beginning of the period under
consideration would best serve this purpose; this is, however, countered by the smaller number of
companies included in previous updates.
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both in update 64 and in update 125. In order to avoid distortions resulting from an
increased number of enterprises contained in the sample as well as the higher
proportion of financial statements covered in more recent years, we traced the
development of the relative proportion of controlled companies to all subsidiaries
covered by AMADEUS. The year-by-year result of this analysis is shown for both
test-panels in Fig. 1.
Figure 1 indicates in the case of both panels a slight reduction in the relative
proportion of controlled companies for the period 1994–2000 and a marked increase
in the years 2001–2003. The tendency of this development corresponds to the results
of the federal statistics on corporate tax. However, this observation does not give
any explanation as to whether this development is due to the extended tax
advantages or to the reduced tax group prerequisites as applicable since 2001.
3.2.2 Decision to opt for a tax group: advantages/disadvantages associated
with intra-group loss offset
Tax groups give rise to advantages where a set-off of losses is possible between group
companies. It may therefore be expected that in comparison to companies belonging
to a standard group controlled companies in general show losses more frequently. For
parent companies reporting losses, on the other hand, forming a tax group was not
necessary in order to set off losses against profits of a subsidiary under the credit
method. For the latter constellation, therefore, no major differences between standard
groups and tax groups are to be expected. For purposes of categorizing groups
according to the income of the group companies, the standard groups and the tax
groups included in the database were examined with respect to the distribution of
profits and losses between parent company and subsidiary. To this end the following
four scenarios for each year were distinguished. Hereby, income is defined in the case
of the subsidiary as ordinary profit, and in the case of the parent company as ordinary
profit less profit or loss transferred, or dividends distributed,17 by the subsidiary.
Fig. 1 Relative share of controlled companies over the period under review. Source: Calculations based
on AMADEUS (125). This figure depicts the relative share of companies included in Panel 1 and Panel 2
for which the option to form a tax group has been used (controlled companies)
17 Dividend distributions are estimated by comparing the profit and loss for the period with the change in
equity (other than capital stock).
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1. Income of the parent company [ zero, income of the subsidiary [ zero (Profit/
Profit),
2. Income of the parent company [ zero, income of the subsidiary \ zero (Profit/
Loss),
3. Income of the parent company \ zero, income of the subsidiary [ zero (Loss/
Profit),
4. Income of the parent company \ zero, income of the subsidiary \ zero (Loss/
Loss).
Our findings demonstrate that in the periods prior to the 2001 tax reform (1994–
2000), losses only at the level of the subsidiary can be observed more commonly in
controlled companies belonging to a tax group than in the case of subsidiaries
belonging to a standard group (Profit/Loss). If the losses are incurred only by the
parent company no major differences are to be observed between companies
belonging to a tax group and standard groups. This scenario (Loss/Profit) can also be
observed more frequently in the case of a tax group, however, while scenarios with
both the parent and the subsidiary earning profits (Profit/Profit) or losses (Loss/Loss)
occur more frequently in standard group constellations. On closer consideration it
may well be puzzling that almost half of the cases fall into the category where there
is no loss-offset between the companies. But before drawing the conclusion that
intra-group loss-offset must be relatively insignificant for setting up of a tax group,
one should take into account the fact that the observations refer to individual years
while a profit and loss transfer agreement must be concluded for a minimum period
of 5 years. Furthermore, it must be remembered that the results of our analysis
reflect the results of past years while the decision to form a tax group is based on
expectations.
Under the exemption method offsetting losses of the parent company against
profits of a subsidiary is only possible within a tax group. It is therefore to be
expected that in comparison with firms belonging to a standard group parent
companies report losses more commonly in the context of a tax group. Besides,
offset of losses of the subsidiary against profits of the parent company necessitates
that a tax group exists between the companies. The frequency of the different profit
and loss situations in standard groups and tax groups after the 2001 tax reform is
shown in the lower section of Table 5.
These results for the period 2001–2003 demonstrate that a distribution in which
the losses are reported at the level of the parent companies and profits at the level of
the subsidiaries is more common in the case of tax groups (Loss/Profit). Where a
parent company reports profits, losses of a subsidiary are also observed more
frequently under the provisions of a tax group (Profit/Loss). The case of both parent
company and subsidiary reporting profits is more commonly observed among
standard groups. The same applies where both parent company and subsidiary report
losses.
Loss carry forwards at the level of the subsidiary should restrain companies from
entering into a tax group. This holds true in particular where both the parent
company and the subsidiary are profitable. In order to differentiate existing tax
groups according to the presence of accrued losses to be carried forward at the level
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of the controlled companies, amounts of an inter-period loss-carry forward were
assessed on the basis of negative equity capital other than capital stock. For
purposes of excluding any endogenous influence, only subsidiaries that did not form
part of a tax group in 2000 were taken into consideration. Our calculations reveal
that within this panel (tax groups formed in the new setting) subsidiaries displaying
negative equity capital (other than capital stock) function as controlled companies in
17.81% of all cases, whereas the proportion of companies displaying positive equity
capital (other than capital stock) amounts to 35.13%.
3.2.3 Decision to opt for a tax group: costs of implementation
Concluding a profit and loss transfer agreement requires numerous resolutions,
reports, audits, and registration of this agreement with the commercial register
(§§ 293, 294 CTA). As most of these costs do not depend on company size, we
expect the probability of the existence of a tax group to rise with the size of the
group companies. In order to investigate the relationship between tax group and size
of group companies, we categorized all (tax and standard) groups of companies
according to the size of the group as a whole and the size of the subsidiaries. For the
size of subsidiaries, we took the determinants employed for size differentiation in
preparing financial statements as our categorization criteria; our categorization
criterion for group size was the number of group companies.18
It emerges that the ratio of controlled companies to all subsidiaries of a
consolidated group increases the larger the size of the subsidiaries. The proportion
of controlled companies is 56.85% where large subsidiaries are involved, whereas
medium-sized subsidiaries and small subsidiaries form part of a tax group in only
51.15 and 39.91%, respectively. A comparable picture emerges when the size of the
entire group is categorized.
Moreover, a profit and loss transfer agreement must include provisions regarding
compensation and settlement in cash or kind (§§ 304, 305 CTA). These
requirements necessitate evaluation of the companies in light of their future profit
potential, give rise to costs, and in practice are often subject to long-winded
Table 5 Frequency (in %) of different profit/loss situations in standard groups and tax groups
Type of group Time period Profit/Profit Profit/Loss Loss/Profit Loss/Loss
Standard groups 1994–2000 0.5338 0.1526 0.2189 0.0947
Tax groups 1994–2000 0.3913 0.2774 0.2795 0.0518
Standard groups 2001–2003 0.5537 0.1561 0.1914 0.0989
Tax groups 2001–2003 0.3965 0.2417 0.2856 0.0762
Source: Calculations based on AMADEUS (125). This table summarizes the frequency (in %) of the
different profit/loss situation in standard groups and tax groups before and after the 2001 tax reform. To
this end the number of observations showing the respective profit/loss situation is set in relation to the
overall number of observations within each of the four sub-samples. The frequencies total 1 in each line.
Bold values indicate the more frequent observations
18 A small group consists of up to five group companies, whereas a medium-sized group consists of up to
50 and a large group of more than 50 group companies.
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disputes, hence deterring parties from forming a tax group (Orth 2005; Prinz 2003).
Therefore, the expectation is that companies are more frequently held by one sole
shareholder where the controlled company forms part of a tax group rather than
belonging to a standard group of companies. For the purpose of getting a first
impression of this effect, we determined the proportions of tax groups and standard
groups with respect to different quantitative threshold values. Figure 2 depicts these
proportions.
It becomes clear that 80% of the controlled companies forming part of a tax
group are held to 100% by the controlled company or a third group company, i.e.
minority shareholders exist in only 20%, whereas in the context of a standard group
the proportion of companies held by the parent company to 100% accounts for
merely 66%. The overall average holding of group companies by parent companies
emerges as 96% in the case of controlled companies (whereas this percentage
amounts to 91% in the case of subsidiaries belonging to a standard group).
3.2.4 Decision to opt for a tax group: liability risks
A fundamental disadvantage militating against the creation of a tax group is the
liability for losses incurred by the controlled company that results from conclusion
of a profit and loss transfer agreement. The degree of this liability risk is dependent
upon both the operative and financial risk of the subsidiary and the legal form of the
controlling company.
For purposes of capturing the business risk and the risk associated with the
capital structure of the subsidiary we determine the percentage of controlled
companies subject to the equity ratio and the standard deviation regarding the return
on sales (Table 6). In order to avoid endogenous effects we refer to the equity ratio
as prevailing prior to the possible implementation of a tax group. The values
presented in Table 6 reflect the frequency of tax groups newly founded after 2000,
with reference to the impact of the equity ratio.
The two sets of calculations show only minor variations. Although the percentage
of controlled companies ranges from 38.65 to 50.00% among the various quantiles
Fig. 2 Participation quotas in standard groups and tax groups. Source: Calculations based on
AMADEUS (125). This figure depicts the share of subsidiaries in standard groups and tax groups for
which the participation quota exceeds the respective thresholds
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of the standard deviation regarding the return on sales, no increase can be observed
for the higher and smaller values of this measure. The same applies in principle to
the equity ratio as prevailing prior to forming a tax group.
Where the parent company and the subsidiary form part of the same industry, the
cyclical development affects both companies in a comparable way. In these cases
the advantageousness of a tax group is expected to be limited as uniform influence
of the business cycle increases the probability that parent company and subsidiary
both produce positive or negative income. By the same token, in the absence of
diversification an economic downturn gives rise to increased liability risk. For
purposes of analyzing the possible interrelation between tax group and the industry
in which parent company and subsidiary operate we determined the proportion of
companies opting for a tax group within groups belonging to the same business
sector in comparison with standard groups. It is revealed that in standard groups
parent company and subsidiary operate in the same industry in 37.45% of all




Our regression analysis looks at two issues are addressed. Firstly, we investigate
how companies balance in their decision tax advantages and non-tax disadvantages
resulting from entering into a tax group. Secondly, we test whether, and if so to what
extent, the 2001 tax reform has affected this company decision. Two different
treatment effects are possible in this context as the reform has, on the one hand,
increased the tax advantages of a tax group and, on the other hand, reduced the tax
group prerequisites. In the course of this latter adjustment, the non-tax costs have
risen, while the number of subsidiaries not eligible for inclusion in a tax group has
declined. Given this quasi-experimental setting we apply a difference-in-difference
approach for our analysis.19 To this end, we split up our observations for each
Table 6 Frequency of tax groups in sub-samples with differing equity ratios and standard deviations of


























0.3865 0.4220 0.4929 0.4752 0.4752 0.4610 0.4787 0.4397 0.5000 0.4733
Equity ratio 0.3860 0.2537 0.3784 0.3676 0.2813 0.2879 0.3788 0.4035 0.3088 0.2857
Source: Calculations based on AMADEUS (125). We divided the subsidiaries in our sample into ten groups with
regard to standard deviation of return on sales and the equity ratio. This table illustrates the percentage of controlled
companies in any of these sub-samples
19 See also Overesch and Wamser (2009) for an application of a difference-in-difference approach to
explain tax reform effects.
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company into a first observation referring to years 1994–2000 and a second
observation referring to years 2001–2003. For purposes of distinction we include the
post reform dummy REFORM, which takes the value of one if the observation
refers to the post-reform period.
For our analysis we use a logistic regression model based on the dependent
variable TG. This variable takes on the value of one if a subsidiary meets the
requirements of a controlled company for corporate tax purposes in at least 1 year
during the relevant period under consideration (1994–2000 or 2001–2003),
otherwise the value is zero. As described earlier, we assume that a tax group
exists where the profit or loss of the subsidiary for the period is transferred in full to
a parent company. Profit transfers and assumption of losses are shown in the
extraordinary income. Thus it is possible to assume the presence of a controlled
company where the subsidiary’s profit or loss for the period is shown as zero
whereas the result of ordinary business activities is above or below zero. As far as
Panel 1 is concerned TG is assigned the value of one in 32% of all cases prior to the
reform and 49% of all cases after the reform. The corresponding values for Panel 2
amount to 42 and 58%, respectively. Based on the discussions above it should
follow that the use of a tax group is subject to a number of different tax and non-tax
parameters. For the purposes of detailed analysis the following independent
variables are employed (Table 7).
MINORITY, MIN_SH, ENTERPRISE and GROUPSIZE reflect the fact that
costs associated with concluding a profit and loss transfer agreement (e.g. costs due
to legal disputes with regard to compensation payments if minority shareholders are
involved) may deter especially small companies and groups from entering into a tax
group. Moreover, liability risks have particular impact where minority shareholders
exist as compensation payments have to be paid even if the controlled company
suffers losses. The interaction between costs and risks resulting from the existence
of minority shareholders and the subsidiary size is further accounted for by
including the interaction term MIN_SH*ENTERPRISE into our model. According
to the hypotheses 6 and 7 set out in Sect. 2.4 we expect negative coefficients to be
estimated for all of these variables. PL and LP_30/LP_50/LP_80 stand for the tax
advantages from intra-group loss-offset arising in the context of a tax group. High
values of PL are associated with benefits arising both prior to and after the 2001 tax
reform, whereas in the case of the different specifications of LP taking a value of
one, advantages arise from entering into a tax group especially in 2001 and
subsequent years. ROS (SD) and SAME INDUSTRY account for the liability risks
associated with concluding a profit and loss transfer agreement, which are assumed
to reduce the probability for forming a tax group (see hypothesis 8 in Sect. 2.4).
The regression model applied does not include variables reflecting tax group
disadvantages in the presence of pre-contractual losses, the increased liability risk in
case the subsidiary has a small equity ratio, and business-cycle effects. The first two
of these effects are, in the way they are included in our data, expected to be
dependent on the existence of a tax group and are therefore excluded for reasons of
endogeneity. Including a variable reflecting the economic performance picks up the
influence of the economic downturn in the years 2001 and 2002 on the decision as to
whether or not to opt for a tax group. However, such a variable is highly negatively
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Table 7 Descriptive statistics on the dependent and independent variables (Panel 1)
Name Description Scale Mean SD Min. Max.
TG Takes on the value of one if a subsidiary meets
the requirements of a controlled company for
income tax purposes in at least one year
during the relevant period under
consideration (1994–2000 or 2001–2003),
otherwise the value is zero.
Dummy 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
REFORM Takes the value of one if the observation refers
to the post-reform period. Otherwise a value
of zero is assigned.
Dummy 0.50 0.50 0.00 1.00
ENTERPRISE Takes on the value of one if according to the
Commercial Code the subsidiary is classified
as a small company. Otherwise the value of
this variable is zero.
Dummy 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
GROUP SIZE This variable reflects the number of group
companies and is represented in terms of its
natural logarithm.
ln 2.48 1.45 0.69 6.15
MINORITY This variable takes on the value of one if
minority shareholders exist. Where the
parent company is a sole shareholder, zero is
assigned.
Dummy 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
MIN_SH This variable measures the share in the capital
held by minority investors.
Numeric 7.63 14.35 0 50
PL Measures the relative frequency of cases (in
%) occurring in the period under review
(1994–2003) where the parent company
income is positive whereas the subsidiary
income is negative.
Numeric 0.18 0.31 0.00 1.00
LP_30 Takes the value of one if the frequency of
cases (in %) where the parent company
income is negative whereas the subsidiary
income is positive exceeds the respective
threshold (30%, 50%, 80%) in the period
under review (1994–2003).a
Dummy 0.34 0.48 0.00 1.00
LP_50 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00
LP_80 0.16 0.36 0.00 1.00
ROS (SD) This variable is calculated as the standard
deviation regarding the profit to sales ratio in
the period under review (1994–2003) and is
represented in terms of its natural logarithm.b






This variable takes on the value of one where
the parent company and the subsidiary
belong to the same industry sector (NACE).
The value of zero is assigned if the industry
sectors differ.
Dummy 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
a The alternative specifications of LP are defined as dummy variables since they are applied for the
purpose of differentiating treatment group and control group in our difference-in-difference regression
model
b In order to limit the influence of outliers return on sales ratios of more than plus 100% and less than
minus 100% were eliminated
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correlated with the post-reform dummy REFORM and therefore had to be
excluded.20 The resulting regression model reads as follows:
p Organschaft ¼ 1ð Þ ¼ e
z
1 þ ez; with
z ¼ b0 þ b1  REFORM þ b2  TREATMENT þ b3  REFORM  TREATMENT
þ b4  ENTERPRISE þ b5  GROUP SIZE þ b6  MIN SH
þ b7  MIN SH  ENTERPRISE þ b8  ROSðSDÞ þ b9  SAME INDUSTRY þ e:
ð1Þ
The dummy variable TREATMENT stands for the treatment group of the 2001
tax reform quasi-experiment. We distinguish alternative definitions of TREAT-
MENT in order to account for the fact that the tax reform amended both the tax
advantages of, and the prerequisites for, entering into a tax group.21 In a first setting,
subsidiaries negatively affected by the fact that in standard groups losses cannot be
offset vertically downward after the tax reform function as the treatment group.
These are subsidiaries with a value of one for the LP variable. For this group the
reform increased the tax advantages resulting from implementing a tax group, which
leads to the expectation of a positive value for b3. The corresponding control-group
comprises those companies for which the LP variable takes a value of zero meaning
that the tax reform did not extend the tax advantages of implementing a tax group.
In defining the LP variable we distinguish three different specifications reflecting
thresholds of 30, 50 and 80% of all years in which the profit and loss situation in a
group has to be of the relevant type (parent company losses and subsidiary profits)
for the LP variable to take the value of one. This accounts for the fact that
companies might not be influenced in their decision as to whether to opt for a tax
group or not if the occurrence of profits and losses being spread in this manner turns
out to be a single event.
Apart from extending the tax advantages of a tax group with respect to loss-offset
a further consequence of the 2001 tax reform was that the prerequisites for forming
a tax group were relaxed. This amendment might affect small subsidiaries
differently to large subsidiaries assuming that the stricter prerequisites prior to the
reform deterred especially these companies from entering into a tax group. The
same applies to subsidiaries with minority shareholders for which the verification of
organizational and economic integration as required prior to the reform should have
been more difficult than for wholly owned subsidiaries. We therefore estimate
additional regression models with the treatment group of the reform being defined as
small companies (ENTERPRISE = 1) and companies with minority shareholders
20 The correlation between REFORM and GDP takes on the value of -0.944. The latter variable is
measured as the average growth of real GDP in the years for which AMADEUS provides data for the
subsidiary during the relevant period under consideration (1994 to 2000 or 2001 to 2003 respectively).
21 See Sect. 2.2 for a discussion concerning the impact of the 2001 tax reform on the decision to opt for a
tax group.
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(MINORITY = 122), respectively, expecting positive difference-in-difference esti-
mators in both cases.
3.3.2 Regression results
Table 8 presents the regression results for the treatment group defined with regard to
the variable LP, reflecting the scenario that the parent company incurs losses while
the subsidiary is profitable. Specifications (1)–(3) are based on the logistic
regression model as set out above and apply the different thresholds of 30, 50 and
80% for the determination of LP. Specification (4) applies a linear probability model
to Panel 1, whereas specification (5) applies the logistic regression model to Panel 2,
both being estimated for robustness check purposes. Applying the regression model
to Panel 2 helps to reduce the extent to which the regression may be distorted by the
fact that companies in the sample did not qualify as subsidiaries throughout the
whole period under consideration.
The results for the estimation of specifications (1)–(3) indicate that—as expected
in hypothesis 1 (Sect. 2.4)—the probability for subsidiaries entering into a tax group
increased significantly after the tax reform. The odds ratio for the probability of
entering into a tax group is increased by the factor e0.636 = 1.89 [specification (3)] if
REFORM takes up a value of one. However, due to the exogenous shock of the
economic downturn taking place at the same time we cannot unambiguously assign
this effect to the fact that the tax group prerequisites were relaxed. The positive
coefficient for REFORM*TREATMENT, however, reveals that the probability for
entering into a tax group was increased to a greater extent for companies belonging
to the treatment group than for companies belonging to the control group. This
result confirms hypothesis 2 as set out in Sect. 2.4. Both the size of this effect and its
significance depend on the threshold applied for defining LP. If a threshold of 80%
is applied,23 the odds ratio is significantly increased by the factor e0.549 = 1.73 for
companies belonging to the treatment group as compared to companies that are part
of the control group. A lower threshold gives rise to a reduced impact of the reform
on the decision made by companies in the treatment group, given a smaller increase
of the odds ratios by the factor e0.408 = 1.50 and e0.327 = 1.39 respectively. In both
specifications, the estimator for REFORM*TREATMENT turns out to be less
significant.
Irrespective of the influence exerted by the tax reform, our analysis indicates, that
as a rule, both costs and liability risks associated with concluding a profit and loss
transfer agreement deter companies from entering into a tax group (see hypotheses 6
and 7 as set out above). In this context, the odds ratio is reduced significantly by the
factor e-0.030 = 0.97024 for each percent held in the subsidiary by minority
22 In these regression models the interaction term MINORITY*ENTERPRISE is included instead of
MIN_SH*ENTERPRISE.
23 This means that companies are only included in the treatment group if the scenario of the parent
company incurring losses and the subsidiary being profitable occurs in at least 80 percent of all years.
24 Value refers to specification (3).
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shareholders. Being a small company further reduces the probability of entering into
a tax group significantly. Amongst the variables that reflect the risk for the parent
company of becoming liable for losses of the subsidiary [ROS(SD) and SAME
INDUSTRY] only SAME INDUSTRY shows significant influence. The negative
sign of the estimated coefficient gives indirect support hypothesis 8 in Sect. 2.4 that
the probability of entering into a tax group is reduced with increasing risk of the
subsidiary.
Table 8 Regression results (1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel Panel 1 Panel 1 Panel 1 Panel 1 Panel 2
TREATMENT LP_30 LP_50 LP_80 LP_80 LP_80





































































































Observations 1,320 1,320 1,320 1,320 240
Percentages correctly predicted 64.6 64.5 64.7 62.5
Nagelkerkes R2 0.117 0.122 0.128 0.146
Adjusted R2 0.088
Hosmer–Lemeshow
Chi Squared 6.198 10.273 11.819 6.007
Significance 0.625 0.246 0.159 0.646
Dependent variable: TG. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. Robust
and clustered (industry clusters) standard errors are given in parentheses. A constant is used but not
reported. Variables are largely uncorrelated (\0.7); see the Appendix for a correlation matrix
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The results of the regression analyses further demonstrate that—as expected—the
manner in which profits and losses are spread amongst parent company and
subsidiaries has significant influence on the decision to form a tax group for income
tax purposes. Whereas the situation in which the parent company incurs losses while
the subsidiary is profitable increases the probability for forming a tax group,
especially after the tax reform—as seen above—the frequency of the opposite
situation has a strong and significant positive influence, both in the period prior to
and the period following the tax reform. The impact of these two different profit and
loss constellations differs although the tax group advantages regarding intra-group
loss offset are the same in both cases. If the parent company is profitable throughout
the whole period under consideration whereas the subsidiary incurs losses in any
period (PL = 1), the odds ratio for entering into a tax group is increased by the
factor e0.759 = 2.14.25 In the case of the opposite constellation (LP_80 = 1) the
odds ratio is increased by the factor e0.549 * e0.423 = 2.64. The smaller impact
arising in the case of the subsidiary incurring losses may be due to the higher
liability risk associated with this constellation.
In order to assess the overall validity of the model applied, we report (a) Pseudo-
R2 according to the formula recommended by Nagelkerke, (b) the portion of
observations classified correctly by the model as standard group or tax group (hit
ratio) and (c) the results of the Hosmer–Lemeshow test. Thereby, Nagelkerkes R2 is
reported as a goodness-of-fit statistic, whereas the hit ratio and the results of the
Hosmer–Lemeshow test are reported in order to assess the ability of the model to
classify subsidiaries correctly (see Nagelkerke 1991; Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989).
The resulting values for Nagelkerkes R2 between 11.7 and 12.8% are not
unsatisfactorily low taking into account the complexity of the underlying company
decision. The same holds true for the hit ratio, which takes values of 64.6, 64.5 and
64.7%. The results of the Hosmer–Lemeshow test show no significant difference
between the observed and the expected values in any of the three specifications,
indicating that the model is appropriate to explain the use of a tax group.
Furthermore, specifications (4) and (5) that are estimated for robustness-check
purposes confirm most of the measured effects in their direction. Apart from a
different sign for ENTERPRISE and MIN_SH*ENTERPRISE, differences arise
only with regard to the size and the significance of the effects which in the case of
specification (5) should be due especially to the much smaller number of companies
included in the sample.
As outlined above, additional regression models are estimated with the treatment
group of the reform being defined as small companies (ENTERPRISE = 1) and
companies with minority shareholders (MINORITY = 1), respectively. In doing so,
we test whether, and if so, to what extent the relaxation of the tax group
prerequisites has been of particular impact for these companies. The results of these
additional regressions as reported in Table 9,26 however, do not support the
25 If PL is defined as a dummy similar to LP_80 the odds ratio would be increased by e0.789 = 2.20.
26 Again, the results of the corresponding linear probability models are reported for robustness check
purposes as specifications (3) and (4).
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expectations as set out above. The estimator for the interaction term
REFORM*TREATMENT emerges as being insignificant for both definitions of
the treatment group and for both the logistic and linear models.
Table 9 Regression results (2)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel Panel 1 Panel 1 Panel 1 Panel 1
TREATMENT ENTERPRISE MINORITY ENTERPRISE MINORITY

















































































Observations 1,320 1,320 1,320 1,320
Percentages correctly predicted 64.1 65.3
Nagelkerkes R2 0.126 0.125
Adjusted R2 0.085 0.085
Hosmer–Lemeshow
Chi Squared 10.713 5.67
Significance 0.219 0.684
Dependent variable: TG.***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. Robust
and clustered (industry clusters) standard errors are given in parentheses. A constant is used but not
reported. Variables are largely uncorrelated (\0.7); see the Appendix for a correlation matrix
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4 Conclusion
The focus of this paper is on the determinants of opting for the German group
taxation regime with regard to taxes on corporate profits. As has been shown above,
meeting the requirements of a tax group brings tax advantages on the one hand, and
non-tax disadvantages in terms of costs and the assumption of liability risks on the
other, for the companies concerned. The question therefore arose as to the kind of
companies choosing not to exploit the tax advantages inherent to using a tax group,
and the extent to which this is the case. Furthermore, the paper addresses the
question as to whether, and if so to what extent, the 2001 German tax reform has
affected this company decision.
Our regression analysis reveals that companies tend to make use of the tax group
option especially where tax benefits are substantial. In the case of less apparent tax
benefits the use of the instrument is less widespread. Since the advantages of forming
a tax group were enhanced with the introduction of the exemption method and the
prerequisites for forming a tax group were relaxed at the same time, the probability of
entering into a tax group increased significantly as from 01.01.2001. This holds true
especially for companies that benefit from the enhanced tax advantages under the tax
group regime as introduced in 2001. Significant factors hindering companies from
forming a tax group turned out to be the company size and the existence of minority
shareholders. Being not wholly owned or being a small company reduces
significantly the odds ratio for subsidiaries entering into a tax group.
Altogether, the percentage of controlled companies amounts to only around 30%
of eligible companies meeting the requisite participation threshold. Although it has to
be borne in mind that the factors influencing the decision to form a tax group are not
covered in their entirety by our results, we nevertheless conclude that the ‘‘price’’ of
meeting the tax group requirement to enter into a profit and loss transfer agreement
is, for many companies, too high. If the requirement of this agreement were to be
abolished on the grounds of facilitating access to the benefits of group taxation, this
would therefore signify the removal of a major obstacle to forming a tax group. To
what extent the removal of this obstacle would result in more intensive use of the tax
group option remains to be investigated. This subject for future research requires data
providing evidence on how companies perceive the increased liability risk that is
associated with entering into a profit and loss transfer agreement.
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See Table 10.
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